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Abstract
The speed of ination adjustment to aggregate technology shocks is substantially larger than to
monetary policy shocks. Prices adjust very quickly to technology shocks, while they only respond
sluggishly to monetary policy shocks. This evidence is hard to reconcile with existing models
of stickiness in prices. I show that the di¤erence in the speed of price adjustment to the two
types of shocks arises naturally in a model where price setting rms optimally decide what to pay
attention to, subject to a constraint on information ows. In my model, rms pay more attention
to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks when the former a¤ects prots more than the
latter. Furthermore, strategic complementarities in price setting generate complementarities in the
optimal allocation of attention. Therefore, each rm has an incentive to acquire more information
on the variables that the other rms are, on average, more informed about. These complementarities
induce a powerful amplication mechanism of the di¤erence in the speed with which prices respond
to technology shocks and to monetary policy shocks.
1 Introduction
I present a model that is consistent with the empirical evidence that prices respond much
more quickly to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks. I show that this response
pattern arises naturally in a framework based on imperfect information with an endogenous
choice of information structure similar to Sims (2003). In my model, the only obstacle that
1 I am particularly grateful to Martin Eichenbaum, Giorgio Primiceri and Mirko Wiederholt for continous
comments, support and suggestions. I have also beneted from very useful discussions with Larry Christiano,
Lars Hansen, and Eva Nagypal and seminar partecipants at Northwestern Univeristy. Any errors are my
own. E-mail address: l-paciello@northwestern.edu. Tel.: +1-847-287-6520.
2rms have when changing their prices is that they might not be well informed about the
realizations of the shocks of the economy. The ability of a rm to adjust its price quickly
to a particular shock depends on how well informed the rm is about the realization of that
shock. The more attention a rm chooses to pay to a given shock, the more informed the
rm is about the realizations of that shock. Similar to Sims (2003), I assume there is a limit
on the total attention the rm can pay to the di¤erent shocks impacting on the economy.
Therefore, if the rm allocates more attention to technology shocks, it must allocate less
attention to monetary policy shocks. In my model, the rm will optimally choose to allocate
more attention to those particular shocks that most reduce prots when prices are not
adjusted properly. Since technology shocks a¤ect prots more than monetary policy shocks,
the rm will allocate more attention to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks.
Other things being equal, this e¤ect helps to rationalize the observed di¤erential speed
with which prices respond to technology shocks and to monetary policy shocks. However,
this e¤ect alone is not large enough to quantitatively account for the di¤erential response.
Fortunately, complementarities in price setting generate complementarities in rmsdecision
about which information to acquire1. These complementarities induce rms to acquire and
process more information on the same variables that other rms are more informed about.
The reallocation of attention in favor of technology shocks, and away from monetary pol-
icy shocks, generates a large amplication in the di¤erence with which prices respond to
technology shocks and to monetary policy shocks.
I choose the parameters governing rms information processing capabilities such that
the loss each rm faces from not being perfectly informed is a very small fraction of prof-
its. The degree of strategic complementarity in price setting in my model is similar to the
degree of strategic complementarity in price setting generally adopted in the large literature
investigating the implications of price stickiness for the dynamics of macroeconomic vari-
ables2. As it turns out, under my assumptions, rms respond to technology shocks roughly
as they would under complete information. In contrast, rms respond much more slowly to
monetary policy shocks than they would under complete information.
There is a large empirical literature investigating how macroeconomic variables respond
to monetary policy shocks. In this literature, there is substantial consensus that ination
1Hellwig and Veldkamp (2007) theoretically study the role of strategic complementarities in information
choices.
2See Woodford (2003) for a review.
3responds slowly to monetary policy shocks3. A more recent literature investigates the e¤ects
of technology shocks using structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models. Papers in this
literature consistently nd that prices respond in general very quickly to technology shocks4.
Paciello (2007) studies the di¤erential speed in the adjustment of prices to technology and
monetary policy shocks in the context of SVAR models using a variety of alternative iden-
tication schemes, sub-samples, and data from di¤erent countries. I show that the basic
ndings of the SVAR literature with respect to the di¤erence in the speed with which prices
respond to technology shocks and monetary policy shocks are very robust. The same pat-
terns that hold for the United States also hold for Canada, France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. I argue that the SVAR results for the United States reect a negative, and statis-
tically signicant, correlation between quarterly aggregate total factor productivity growth
and di¤erent measures of aggregate ination.
The di¤erent speed with which prices respond to technology shocks and to monetary
policy shocks is not easy to reconcile with existing models of price stickiness. For instance,
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) estimate a large-scale dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model with many nominal and real frictions, using U.S. and European data. In their
paper, sticky prices are modeled using Calvo style time-dependent contracts. Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007) nd that the response of prices to technology shocks is very similar
to the response of prices to monetary policy shocks, in terms of speed of adjustment and
persistence. In a related literature, other authors model nominal frictions as arising from
the presence of menu costs5. These costs generate state-dependent pricing. In these mod-
els, rms can adjust prices any time they wish by paying a menu cost. To the best of my
knowledge, the impact of menu costs has not been analyzed in an environment where there
are both aggregate technology shocks and monetary policy shocks. In general, the frequency
of response of prices to technology shocks will be large if these shocks are large. Once rms
have paid the menu cost, they can adjust prices to all realized shocks. Therefore, if rms ad-
just prices very frequently to aggregate technology shocks, they will most likely adjust prices
frequently to monetary policy shocks. Menu costs models would then have a di¢ cult time
in accounting for the di¤erent speed with which prices respond to technology and monetary
policy shocks.
3See for example Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999).
4See for example Shapiro and Watson (1998) or Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005).
5See for example Gertler and Leahy (2006), Golosov and Lucas (2006), Midrigan (2006), Nakamura and
Steinsson (2007).
4The model I propose is related to Woodford (2002). Woodford (2002) uses an incomplete
information model to explain the sluggish response of prices to nominal shocks. He argues
that such a framework could potentially deliver a di¤erential response of prices to aggregate
supply shocks relative to nominal demand shocks, if rms were relatively more informed
about the former than they were about the latter. However, he leaves open the question
of why rms should choose to be relatively more informed about some shocks. Sims (2003)
and Mackóviak and Wiederholt (2007) study the endogenous optimal choice of the infor-
mation structure. In particular, Mackóviak and Wiederholt (2007) focus on the di¤erential
response of prices to aggregate nominal shocks versus idiosyncratic shocks in a framework
with limited information-processing capabilities, and with an exogenous process for nominal
spending. Firms use signals to set prices, but in their paper the signals are endogenous.
Firms decide to be relatively more informed about idiosyncratic shocks because the latter
have a larger impact on the prot-maximizing price. Furthermore, when rms pay limited
attention to aggregate conditions, there is a lower incentive for other rms to pay attention
to aggregate conditions. The model I propose di¤ers from Ma´ckoviak and Wiederholt (2007)
in at least two dimensions. The rst di¤erence is that I introduce two types of aggregate
shocks. This assumption has important consequences, as it allows me to not only provide
an explanation for the di¤erential speed of adjustment of prices to such shocks, but it gen-
erates a large di¤erence in the allocation of attention by price setters across shocks through
complementarities in price setting. The second di¤erence is that I embed the attention allo-
cation problem in a more standard general equilibrium framework that captures the roles of
di¤erent actors in inuencing the di¤erential responses of prices, with particular emphasis
on the central bank.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, I introduce the main empirical
facts that motivate the paper. In section 3, I describe the model. In section 4, I derive the
solution of the attention allocation problem in the special case when the model is calibrated
to be static. In section 5, I outline the numerical procedure to solve the model, choose
the parameters, and comment on the results. Section 6 contains an analysis of the roles of
complementarities, monetary policy, and information structure in the di¤erential response
of prices. Section 7 concludes.
52 Facts
Paciello (2007) investigates in details the responses of aggregate prices to monetary policy
and technology shocks using SVAR models. Here, I report the results from the benchmark
estimation procedure for the U.S. economy. I use a SVAR methodology to document the
responses of aggregate prices to total factor productivity (TFP) shocks and monetary policy
shocks. To this aim, I consider the following reduced form VAR:
Yt = (L)Yt 1 + ut;
where Y contains all the variables of interest, and (L) is a lag operator of order p. The
covariance matrix of the vector of reduced-form residuals, ut; is : The variables I include
in the benchmark specication are the growth rate in labor productivity, the Federal Re-
serve Funds rate (FFR), the GDP deator ination, commodity ination, the logarithm of
per-capita hours worked, the logarithms of the ratios of consumption and investment to out-
put, the logarithm of money velocity and the logarithm of labor productivity adjusted real
hourly wages6. In this specication, the Federal Reserve Fund rate is the monetary policy
instrument, although results hold for other choices of instruments too. The sample period is
1959:2 - 2007:27 and, based on the Akaike criterion, I choose the number of lags to be four,
even if results are robust to di¤erent choices. Identication in the structural VAR litera-
ture amounts to providing enough restrictions to recover the decomposition of the estimated
matrix of variance covariance of the reduced form VAR:
 = A0A
0
0:
From this relationship and imposed restrictions, there is a unique mapping from ut to the
vector of orthogonal structural shocks, t; such that ut = A0t: Once this map is dened, it
6This specication is similar to the one used by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005), Francis
and Ramey (2005). Results would be unchanged to more parsimonious specications.
7The following variables were obtained from DRI Basic Economic Database. Nominal gross output is mea-
sured by GDPD, real gross output by GDPQ. Nominal investment is GCD (household durables consumption)
plus GPI (gross private domestic investment). Nominal consumption is measured by GCN (nondurables) plus
GCS (services) plus GCE (government consumption). Per capita hours worked are measured by LBMNU
(Nonfarm business hours) divided by P16 (US population above 16). Real wages per capita are measured by
LBCPU (nominal hourly non-farm business compensation) divided by the price index and P16. The price
index is GDP/GDPQ. Commodity price index is an index over commodities available from DRI.
I obtained the Federal Funds rate (FedFunds) and M2 (M2MSL) from FRED. Monthly data were converted
into quarterly frequency averaging over the quarter.
6is possible to estimate the series of structural shocks and the responses of the variables into
the system to such shocks. Since I am interested in two structural shocks, I only need to
give conditions to dene the mapping from ut to the neutral and monetary policy technology
shocks. I identify the column of A0 relative to the neutral technology shocks through long
run restrictions as in Gali (1999), using a property of standard neoclassical models, where the
only type of shock having an impact on labor productivity in the long run is a permanent
technology shock. The column of A0 relative to the monetary policy shocks is identied
as in Christiano et al (2003), relying on the assumption that the Federal Reserve set the
monetary policy instrument after some other variables have been realized. This means that
there is a subset of variables in Y; the ones in the Federal Reservefeedback rule, to which
the monetary policy shock is orthogonal. I therefore assume that all variables in the VAR
enter the feedback rule except for the velocity of money.
The results presented in Figure 1 show that a positive TFP shock has a sudden impact
on the GDP deator, with ination dropping contemporaneously to the shock and then
quickly converging to zero. In particular, a one basis point increase in TFP reduces prices
on impact by approximately 0.35 basis points. The two standard deviations error bands
conrm that this result is signicant at a 5 percent signicance level. On the inverse, the
GDP deator responds very slowly to a FFR shock, with the peak of the response taking
place approximately twelve quarters after the shock. In particular, following a negative one
basis point shock to the FFR, we have to wait approximately six quarters before ination
is positive and statistically di¤erent from zero. But even then, the magnitude of ination
is no larger than 0.08 basis points. Table 1 contains the variance decomposition of the
forecast error for ination in terms of fractions of total variance. The rst result is that
the TFP shock accounts for most of the variance of the forecast error of ination for the
rst 10 quarters. The second is that on the inverse the monetary policy shock explains a
marginal proportion. Hence technology shocks are a much more important determinant of
the volatility of ination than monetary policy shocks.
These ndings support the thesis that prices respond much more quickly to a technology
shock than they do to a monetary policy shock. Most of the adjustment to the former
takes place along with the shock, while most of the response to the latter materializes
several quarters after the shock. The di¤erential speed of adjustment in prices is very large,
suggesting that the two shocks generate very di¤erent incentives for rms to adjust their
prices accordingly.
73 The model economy
I introduce a dynamic general equilibrium model with three types of actors: households,
rms and central bank. Since I am interested in rmsprice-setting behavior, I assume that
these have limited information processing capabilities of the type suggested by Sims (2003).
For tractability, I assume that households and central bank have complete information8.
Households choose consumption, bond holdings, investments in physical capital, amount of
working hours and capital services to supply to rms. The central bank sets nominal rates
following a Taylor type rule. There is a constant return to scale production function common
to all producers, which use labor, capital and intermediate inputs as factors of production.
The only two exogenous shocks are an aggregate neutral technology shock and a monetary
policy shock.
3.1 Households
The household side of the economy is modeled along the same lines as that of Smets and
Wouters (2007). Households have complete information. They maximize expected dis-
counted utility given by:
E0
1X
t=0
t

ln (Ct   bCt 1)   0
1 +  l
L
1+ l
t

; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, Ct is the households aggregate consumption, Lt
denotes the household supply of labor, b is the coe¢ cient dening the degree of habit per-
sistence in preferences,  0 and  l determine respectively the level and the convexity of the
disutility of labor. A complete set of Arrow-Debreu contingent securities, Vt+1 (!) ; is traded
in the economy. The household budget constraint and the technology to accumulate capital
at period t can be written as:
PtCt +
Bt
Rt
+ PtIt +
Z


gt (!)Vt+1 (!) d! (2)
= Bt 1 + PtWtLt + Pt
 
rkt ut  	(ut)

Kt + Vt + Ptt;
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt +

1  S

It
It 1

It; (3)
8Adams (2007) uses similar assumptions of complete information on households and central banks to study
the optimal monetary policy in an economy where rms have limited information processing capabilities.
8where Kt is the stock of physical capital at the beginning of period t, ut is the capital utiliza-
tion rate so that utKt is the total service of capital at time t; It is the level of investments,
Rt is the gross nominal interest rate on the risk free bonds Bt, Wt and rkt are respectively
the real wage and the rental rate of capital in period t, t is the dividend received from full
ownership in the rms, Pt is the price of the unique nal good of the economy and gt (!) is
the set of prices of state contingent securities. The function S

It
It 1

represents the installa-
tion (disinstallation) costs associated with accumulating (decumulating) stock of capital, and
similarly to Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005) satises S (1) = S 0 (1) = 0; and
S 00 (1) > 0. This captures the idea that installation costs are smaller for smoother growth
rates in investments9. The cost of capital utilization is captured by the function 	(ut). As
in Smets and Wouters (2007), I assume ut = 1 and 	(ut) = 0 on the non-stochastic balanced
growth path.
Knowing the history up to time t, the household chooses the quantities fCt; Bt; It; Kt+1; Lt; utg
and the optimal holdings of state contingent securities, Vt+1 (!) ; so to maximize the expected
discounted utility in (1) subject to (2)  (3).
The composite nal good, Yt; is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over the set of di¤erentiated
goods indexed by z;
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (z)
 1

 
 1
; (4)
where  is the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent varieties. I assume that Yt is ag-
gregated by the household and can be used indi¤erently for consumption, investments or
production as an intermediate input.
3.2 Monetary Policy
The monetary policy authority sets short term nominal interest rates, Rt; following a Taylor
type rule described by:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
r 1 + t
1 + 
 1 + yt
1 + y
y
e"
r
t ; (5)
9Although capital adjustment costs do not play any role in the di¤erential response of prices to the two
aggregate shocks, they turn out to be important in order to have a drop in nominal rates, Rt; following a
negative shock to "r:
9where "rt  N (0; 2r) is the iid shock to the policy rule, R and  are the non-stochastic
steady state values of nominal interest rates and ination, t is the ination rate at t, yt is
the growth rate in real value added output10 at time t, and y is the non-stochastic steady
state value of output growth. Orphanides (2003b) has shown that a rule specied in terms of
output growth is at least as well representative of the actual monetary policy in the United
States as a rule specied in terms of output levels11. The reliance of information regarding
growth rates, as opposed to natural-rate gaps, is also consistent with verbal descriptions of
policy considerations and is easy to communicate, since output growth rates are usually used
to describe the state of the economy. Orphanides and Williams (2003, 2006) also show that
the rule expressed in terms of growth rates in output is to be preferred to the rule expressed
in terms of levels of output, when the state of the economy, and, in particular, potential
output are unknown. In such a case, a rule specied in di¤erences reduces the volatility of
ination and output induced by errors in the perception of the output gap. Related to this
argument is the fact that I am assuming the central bank has complete information, which
means it perfectly observes current output growth and ination. If I were to model the
rule depending on the levels, I should have scaled the potential output level by the state of
technology in order to have a stationary output gap, as in my model there is a non-stationary
stochastic component of the technology process. In that case, assuming complete information
on the side of the central bank would have implied that the central bank perfectly knows
the current state of technology, which is arguable as sustained by Orphanides and Williams
(2003, 2006). In contrast, the specication in terms of output growth requires the central
bank to only observe current ination and output growth, and to know their steady state
values, which is equivalent to estimate a time trend. I believe that it is realistic to assume
a central bank has enough information processing capabilities to implement such a rule.
3.3 Modeling the limited information capability
Here I introduce the tools used in this paper to model the limited information capability
of rms. I need to dene a measure to quantify the reduction in uncertainty coming from
10Real value added output is the sum of real aggregate consumption and investment, Ct + It:
11For example, similar to Justiniano and Primiceri (2005):
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
r 1 + t
1 + 
  Yt
At
y
e"
r
t
10
information processing. I build on the seminal work of Sims (2003) and use the concept of
entropy to measure uncertainty in economic models. The larger is the entropy of a random
variable, the larger is the uncertainty about its realizations. The entropy H of a stationary
multivariate normally distributed random variable, xT = (x1; x2; :::xT ) ; equals:
H(xT ) =
1
2
log2
h
(2e)T j
xT j
i
;
where j
xT j is the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix of xT . Therefore, a normal
random variable has an entropy that depends only on the second moments of the distribution.
Close to the denition of entropy is the denition of conditional entropy of xT = (x1; x2; :::xT )
given sT = (s1; s2; :::sT ) :
H(xT j sT ) = 1
2
log2
h
(2e)T

xT jsT i ;
where xT and sT must have a joint multivariate normal distribution, and where

xT jsT  is the
determinant of the conditional-covariance matrix of xT given sT : I then dene the reduction
in uncertainty about a vector of multivariate normally distributed random variables xT ; from
observing a vector of multivariate normally distributed random variables sT ; as the di¤erence
between the entropy of xT and the conditional entropy of xT given sT :
I(xT ; sT ) = H(xT ) H(xT j sT ):
This measure is called mutual information. I can then dene the information ow between
two stochastic processes as the average per period amount of information that one process
contains about another process. If xT and sT are the rst T realizations of the processes
fxtg and fstg ; then the information ow can be dened as:
I (fxtg ; fstg) = lim
T!1
1
T
I(xT ; sT ): (6)
In this paper, restricting information processing capabilities means restricting the average
information processed by an agent per period. The information ow dened in (6) is the
measure used for it. In the case of stationary multivariate normally distributed random
variables the information ow reduces to:
I (fxtg ; fstg) = lim
T!1
1
T
log2
 
j
xT j
xT jsT 
!
;
and it is independent of the realizations of the signal process. When the process fstg is
completely uninformative about the realizations of the process fxtg ; as for example if fstg
11
is a constant, the conditional variance-covariance matrix is identical to the unconditional
one, and the implied information ow is zero. When the process fstg is perfectly revealing
about the realizations of fxtg ; there is no more uncertainty about the latter, and

xT jsT 
is zero, implying an innite information ow. A process fstg that is not fully revealing,
but contains some information about the realization of fxtg will imply a nite and strictly
positive information ow.
3.4 Firms
There is a continuum of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive rms of mass one, and
indexed by z. Each rm specializes in the production of a di¤erentiated product. Like Basu
(1995) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007)12, I assume that all products serve both as nal
output in consumption and investments, and as intermediate inputs into the production
process of other products. Incorporating intermediate inputs into the production function
increases the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting. Being that prices of
intermediate inputs are directly linked to the aggregate price, the rigidity of prices to shocks is
therefore amplied and transmitted to rms through rigidity of intermediate inputs prices. In
this structure, there is no rst product that is made without the use of other products13. Each
rm z uses an index of intermediate inputs, Xt(z); for production, which is, for simplicity,
assembled by the household as in (4). The production function of rm z is then:
Yt (z) = At
 
Kt (z)
 Lt (z)
1 1 Xt(z);
where Yt (z) is the gross output of rm z, At is the aggregate productivity variable common
to all rms, which follows an exogenous stochastic process dened by:
ln
At+1
At
= a + a ln
At
At 1
+ "at+1; (7)
12Basu (1995) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) apply this structure to a menu costs type model,
obtaining a high degree of strategic complementarity in price setting. Furthermore, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2007) show that this type of complementarities is well suited to explain the high rigidity of aggregate prices
to demand shock, and the high frequency of price changes due to idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
13As sustained by Basu (1995) this is well representative of the U.S. economy: Input-output studies
certainly do not support the chain of production view, where goods move in only one direction down the stages
of processing. Even the most detailed input-output tables show surprisingly few zeros. In its discussion of the
1977 input-output table, the BEA (1984 p. 50) notes that the table shows heavy interdependence among
industries. Seventy-six of the 85 industries shown in the table required inputs of at least 40 commodities,
and 52 industries required inputs of at least 50 commodities.
12
where "at+1 is normally distributed, "
a
t+1  N (0; 2a) ; and is iid over time. Kt (z) is the
amount of capital services rent from households, and Lt(z) is the labor input hired from the
households by rm z. Total demand for good z; Yt (z) ; is:
Yt (z) = Yt

Pt (z)
Pt
 
;
where aggregate demand, Yt; is:
Yt = Ct + It +
Z 1
0
Xt (z) dz +	(ut)Kt:
Each rm has three decisions to take at each period t. The rm has to choose the optimal
price, Pt (z), at which it is willing to sell any quantity demanded, and the optimal mix
of inputs, both in terms of ratio of capital to labor, kt (z)  Kt(z)Lt(z) ; and in terms of ratio
of intermediate inputs to the other factors of production, xt (z)  Xt(z)Kt(z)Lt(z)1  . I assume
there are three separate decision makers at each rm, one responsible for the choice of the
selling price, one responsible for the optimal capital-to-labor ratio and one responsible for
the intermediate-inputs ratio14. For tractability, the rm is not choosing the optimal basket
of intermediate inputs, Xt (z) ; which is assembled by the household15 as in (4). Formally
the problem of the price setter in each period t; at the rm z; is choosing Pt (z) so to solve:
max
Pt(z)
E
" 1X
=t
 (P (z) ; k (z) ; x (z) ;  ) j stzp
#
(8)
where  is the discount factor16 between period t and t+  , and stzp = fszp;1; szp;2; ::::; szp;tg
denotes the realization of the signal process up to time t for the price setter at rm z. Finally,
t =
 
Yt; Pt; At;Wt; r
k
t

is the vector of realizations of the aggregate variables outside the
control of rm z. The optimization problems of the other two decision makers are similar and
therefore reported in appendix A. Up to this point, the decision problem at rm z is quite
standard. Each agent makes an optimal decision conditional on its information set. If the
information set contained all the realizations of current and past variables in the economy,
14This assumption is similar to the one used by Mankiw and Reis (2006). They assume that at each
rm there is a price setting agent with incomplete information and an input decision maker with complete
information. One di¤erence is that I allow for incomplete information for each decision maker at each rm,
but do not allow incomplete information on the household side.
15An equivalent assumption would be that there is a separate decision maker at each rm that assembles
the basket of intermediate inputs in complete information.
16t+j = 
j Ct bCt 1
Ct+j bCt+j 1 :
13
we would be in the conventional case considered in the literature on monopolistically com-
petitive rms applied to macroeconomic models: rms would price with constant markups
to nominal marginal costs, and the optimal input choice would be dened by the relative
price of production factors. In such a case, it would make no di¤erence whether there are
three separate decision makers or only one, as choices are made on the basis of the same
information set. In this paper, the information sets are endogenous. The optimal signal
process fszp;tg is chosen by the price setter in period zero and satises a constraint on the
average ow of information,
I
n
P ya;t (z) ; P
y
r;t (z)
o
; fszp;tg

 p (9)
where
n
P ya;t (z) ; P
y
r;t (z)
o
is the vector of stochastic processes for the complete information
optimal responses to the two aggregate shocks. The sum of these two processes delivers
the optimal complete information price level, P yt (z) = P
y
a;t (z) + P
y
r;t (z). Therefore P
y
t (z) is
the price level the price-setter at rm z would choose if she had complete information, or
equivalently if p ! +1. In addition to choosing the price level at any period t, in period
zero the price setter at rm z solves the following problem:
max
fszp;tg2S
E
" 1X
t=0
t (P

t (z) ; kt (z) ; xt (z) ; t)
#
(10)
subject to (9) ; where P t (z) solves (8) at each period t. The attention allocation problems
for the other two decision makers are similar and reported in appendix A.
The three decision makers at each rm are indexed by j = p; k; x; indicating respectively
the price setter, the decision maker for the capital-to-labor ratio and the decision maker for
the intermediate-inputs ratio: Each decision maker is endowed with information processing
resources that allow her to process on average j bits of information per period17. The allo-
cation of j across separate decision makers is optimal, in the sense that the marginal value
of additional information across the three agents at each rm is identical, and  =
P
j j
is the total of information-processing resources at each rm;  is chosen so that the overall
marginal value of information at the rm level is very small18, implying a relatively small
17In information theory, the ow of information is measured in bits. One bit is the ow of information
necessary to completely reduce uncertainty about the realization of a discrete random variable with two
equally likely outcomes. See Cover and Thomas (1991) for more details.
18In principle it would be an easy exercise to set up a cost function, or a market for information processing
capabilities. But given there is no microeconomic empirical evidence on such a structure, it is equivalent to
calibrate directly the equilibrium value of :
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friction: rms would invest very few resources to acquire more information processing capa-
bilities at the equilibrium. Intuitively, my model is equivalent to an organization structure
where there are three separate managers at each rm, a marketing manager in charge of the
price choice, a production manager in charge of the optimal mix of capital and labor, and
a purchasing manager, responsible for the optimal level of intermediate inputs relative to
the other factors of production. On top of the three managers, there is a CEO that allo-
cates optimally the rm total information processing resources, ; across the three managers
in period zero. Each decision maker uses its information processing capability to acquire
and process information on those variables that most matter for its choice. Although each
decision maker maximizes the same prot function, the optimal choice of the variable she
is in control of, depends potentially on di¤erent factors. For example the decision maker
in charge of the price level has to process information on the impact its choice has on the
relative demand of the rm. On the inverse, the two decision makers for the capital labor
and intermediate-inputs ratios do not need direct information on demand, as they minimize
the cost of production for any level of demand. I believe that the decision process at the
rm level is a complex activity that involves many individuals, each of them in charge of
a piece of the decision process19. Therefore distributing the decision powers across several
individuals seems more realistic.
3.5 Restrictions on the set of signals for the benchmark model
I assume that signals cannot contain information about future realizations of shocks, "at and
"rt : This removes any forecasting power over shocks that have not yet been realized. This
assumption is not controversial as long as exogenous shocks are assumed to be independent
over time, and this is the case for this paper. Second, I restrict the signals to follow stationary
Gaussian processes:
fszj;t; "at ; "rtg is a stationary Gaussian process. (11)
This assumption allows having a closed form expression for the information ow and facil-
itates the computation of a solution for the optimal signal structure, as it reduces to the
19Zbaracki, Levy and Bergen (2007) study the decision process for a price cut at a large manufacturing
rm. They report that, although the reasons behind the price cut are understood and supported by all
agents, the decision about how to do that is a very complex activity. Di¤erent individuals, in the same rm,
use di¤erent economic models to make optimal choices, each consistent with their own objectives, but also
each competing with the others.
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choice of variance-covariance matrices20. I assume that rms acquire and process information
about the two types of shocks separately. This means that the signal rm z receives at time
t is a vector that can be partitioned into two subvectors, one containing information about
f"at g and one containing information about f"rtg :
fszja;t; "at g and fszjr;t; "rtg are independent. (12)
This assumption is probably extreme, as in reality the two processing activities may have
some overlapping, and hence there might be some learning about one shock by processing
information about the other. I will relax this assumption later in the paper and show that
not only results do still hold, but they are actually reinforced. Finally, I assume that all the
noise in the signal is idiosyncratic, conveying the idea that all the information is available but
the limited information processing capability generates idiosyncratic errors in the processing
of available information.
3.6 Markets clearing conditions and resource constraint
In equilibrium, the markets for labor, capital and intermediate goods clear in each period
t: i) Lt =
R 1
0
Lt (z) dz; ii) utKt =
R 1
0
Kt (z) dz; iii) Xt =
R 1
0
Xt (z) dz: Also, the bonds and
state contingent securities markets clear at each period t and state ! : Bt = 0; Vt (!) = 0:
Finally, the resource constraint is satised in any period t :
Yt = Ct + It +Xt +	(ut)Kt: (13)
4 The solution to the static version of the model
In this section I solve a static version of the model introduced in section 3. This will
provide useful insights and intuitions into how the attention allocation determines the dif-
ferential speed of adjustment of prices to the two aggregate shocks, and how complemen-
tarities and monetary policy a¤ect the responses of prices to these shocks. I impose 
20When the objective function is quadratic, this assumption is not binding, because Gaussian signals turn
out to be optimal. See Ma´ckowiak and Wiederholt (2007) for a proof. I will obtain a quadratic objective
with a second order Taylor expansion. Then the normality assumption is not very restrictive as long as such
approximation is not a bad one.
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equal to zero, so that labor and intermediate inputs are the only inputs in production:
Yt (z) = AtLt (z)
1 Xt (z)
. I also assume that the decision maker choosing the optimal
intermediate-inputs ratio, xt, has complete information. Therefore in this economy only the
price setter faces an attention allocation problem. I impose that At is iid, hence lnAt = "at : I
also assume no habit persistence in the utility function, b = 0: Finally, I restrict the monetary
policy rule to be static, assuming r = 0; and to take the form:
Rt
R
=

Pt
P
 Ct
C
y
e"
r
t ;
where Ct is aggregate demand and coincides with real value added output, and the rule
targets the deviation of the price level from steady state. I solve the model through a log-
linearization around the non-stochastic steady state. The solution procedure for the attention
allocation problem has two steps. In the rst step I formulate a guess for aggregate prices
and I solve for the dynamics of the model implied by the guess. In the second step I solve the
attention allocation problem of the price setter, aggregate prices over rms, and then solve
for the guess. The log-deviation of aggregate prices from steady state at time t is a linear
function of the realizations of two iid shocks at time t; which are the sole state variables21:
P^t = r"
r
t + a"
a
t :
The optimal price of rm z under complete information in log-deviations from steady state
is given by:
P^ yt (z) = P^t + C^t   (1 +  l) "at ; (14)
where  = (1 +  l) (1  ) is the degree of strategic complementarities in price setting, as
dened in Woodford (2003)22, and C^t is the log deviation of real demand from steady state23.
A larger share of intermediate inputs in total costs, ; implies a larger degree of strategic
complementarity in price setting. Given the guess for aggregate prices and the solution for
C^t in terms of the two fundamental shocks, I obtain a linear equation that links the log
deviations of complete information optimal price, P^ yt (z) ; to the two fundamental shocks:
P^ yt (z) =

1   1 + 
1 + y

r + #r

"rt +

1   1 + 
1 + y

a + #a

"at ; (15)
where #r =   1+y ; and #a =

1  : The shock "
i; i = a; r, has an impact on the complete
information price directly through parameter #i; and indirectly through the feedback from
21All variable with a hat are intended in log-deviations from the steady state.
22A larger  means a lower degree of strategic complementarity in price setting.
23See appendix C for details on these derivations.
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aggregates prices. The magnitude of the latter is determined by the degree of strategic
complementarities in prices, and the monetary policy rule. A larger degree of strategic
complementarities, a lower ; implies everything else equal a larger feedback from aggregate
prices. This is intuitive as more complementarities in price setting imply that the action of
each price setter is inuenced more by the average action of the other price setters.
In order to solve for the attention allocation problem in (10) ; I take a log-quadratic
approximation of the sum of the discounted expected prots in (10), expressed in terms of
log deviations from steady state. The optimal allocation of attention problem reduces to24:
min
fszp;tg2S
!1E

P^ t (z)  P^ yt (z)
2
(16)
s:t:
i) : P^ yt (z) =

1   1 + 
1 + y

r + #r

"rt +

1   1 + 
1 + y

a + #a

"at ;
ii) : P^ t (z) = E
h
P^ yt (z) j stzp
i
;
iii) : I (f"at ; "rtg ; fszp;tg)  p:
In solving for the optimal signal process, the price setter minimizes the mean square error
in price setting. Since the objective is quadratic, the optimal price choice in any period t,
P^ t (z) ; will be the projection of P^
y
t (z) on the realizations of the signal process up to time t.
Under the restrictions on S in (11)  (12), the signals take the form of true value plus noise,
sazp;t = "
a
t + au
a
zt (17)
srzp;t = "
r
t + ru
r
zt (18)
where uazt and u
r
zt are iid normally distributed with zero mean and unitary variance. After
some algebra, the attention allocation problem in (16) reduces to25:
min
fa0;r0g
!1
264

~a + #a
2
2a
1 + 
2
a
2a
+

~r + #r
2
2r
1 + 
2
r
2r
375 (19)
s:t:
i :

1 +
2a
2a

1 +
2r
2r

 22
where I have dened for simplicity the variable ~  1   1+
1+y
; which represents the degree of
feedback from aggregate prices to individual rm complete-information optimal prices, and
24See Appendix A for details.
25See Appendix C for more details.
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depends on the degree of complementarities and the monetary policy. The problem in (19)
has a very intuitive interpretation. Firm z chooses the precision of each signal, i; facing the
constraint that the product of the two signal-to-noise ratios cannot exceed an upper bound
coming from limited information processing capabilities. In the case of an interior solution,
the optimal signal-to-noise ratio for each fundamental shock is given by:
1 +
2a
2a
= 2
~a + #a
~r + #r
a
r
; (20)
1 +
2r
2r
= 2
~r + #r
~a + #a
r
a
; (21)
A larger signal-to-noise ratio for a shock means being relatively more informed about that
shock. The signal-to-noise ratios will be larger, the larger the upper bound on information
ow, ; is: the larger the information processing capability at each rm, then the smaller the
rms error as it processes any variable.
I use (20)  (21) and the fact that:
P^t =
Z 1
0
E
h
P^ yt (z) j stzp
i
dz;
to solve for the xed point, (a; r) ; and to determine the response of the aggregate price level
to the fundamental shocks at an interior solution. The xed point at an interior solution26
is:
a = #a

1  ~ + ~2 2

  2  1

1  ~
2
  2 2~2
; (22)
r = #r

1  ~ + ~2 2

  2 
1  ~
2
  2 2~2
: (23)
where
  #a
#r
a
r
; (24)
26The conditions for an interior solution are:(
~  1 
1
 2
 
1 2 2 if   1
~  1 2 1 2 2 if  > 1
The corner solutions are derived in appendix C.
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is the parameter dening the relative impact of a shock on the loss function. The response of
prices to the two shocks is proportional to the direct impact each shock has on the complete
information optimal choice, represented by #i; i = a; r: A larger  means that, everything
else being equal, there is a larger impact of the technology shock on the objective function,
and hence it is more costly to be uninformed about that shock. The larger ; the more
responsive aggregate prices are to the two shocks. As  converges to innity, the price
responses converge to the complete information counterparts, #i
1 ~ :
4.1 Complementarities and trade-o¤ in attention allocation: the
amplication mechanism
I derive an expression that links the relative precision of signals at an interior solution,
1 + 
2
a
2a
1 + 
2
r
2r
; to the coe¢ cient ; and to another coe¢ cient,  that I refer to as the attention
multiplier :
1 + 
2
a
2a
1 + 
2
r
2r
= 22; (25)
 
1 

1   1+
1+y

1 + 1

2 

1 

1   1+
1+y

(1 + 2 )
: (26)
For  > 1; there is an initial incentive at the rm level to process more information on
technology shocks because either they are more volatile, a is larger than r; or they have a
larger impact on the complete information prot-maximizing price, #a is larger than #r: The
attention multiplier, ; will amplify or reduce the incentive to process more information on
the technology shocks depending on the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting,
; and on the monetary policy rule. If the degree of strategic complementarity in price
setting is large enough, or monetary policy is not too much more aggressive on ination than
it is on output, then there will be an amplication of the allocation of attention in favor of
the shock that would already receive more attention, given the initial incentive implied by
the value of . A larger degree of strategic complementarity in price setting, a smaller ;
implies a larger feedback from aggregate prices to the rm level complete information optimal
price, P^ yt (z). This causes a larger di¤erence in the allocation of attention as price-setters
at each rm reallocate resources from one shock to the other, eventually making aggregate
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prices respond even more to technology shocks and even less to monetary policy shocks,
and triggering new reallocations until the xed point is reached. Therefore, through the
positive feedback from aggregate prices, each price-setter has an incentive to allocate more
resources to acquire information on the same type of shocks that other rms acquire more
information on. This mechanism can potentially cause a large diversion of attention towards
the technology shocks. In fact, the attention multiplier, ; has no upper bound:
lim
! 
 = +1; 8 > 1
where  = 2
 
1+2 
1+y
1+
: This result is particularly important, as it implies that no matter how
small the initial incentives to allocate more attention to the technology shock are, hence how
close  is to 1, it is always possible to have a large di¤erence in the allocation of attention
across the two shocks, by choosing a high enough degree of strategic complementarity in
price setting. This is appealing as it implies that such a framework can naturally generate
a very di¤erent response of aggregate prices to the two aggregate shocks, despite that in
principle the impact of such shocks on the variability of the prot-maximizing price is very
similar under complete information. This means that it can achieve a large di¤erence in
the responsiveness of prices to shocks when standard models of price stickiness cannot. For
example, consider a case where  is equal to 2 , and y is equal to : If  is equal to 1;
then  is 0:5: This means that a degree of strategic complementarity, 1   ; close to 0:5
would imply a multiplier, ; close to innity. If  is equal to 3; then  is 0:2; and then, for
a degree of strategic complementarity close to 0:8; the attention multiplier would be close
to innity. These levels of strategic complementarities are not unreasonable if compared to
those typically assumed in the literature on sticky prices27.
The degree of strategic complementarity in price setting and the upper bound on the
information processing capabilities are not the only determinants of the attention multiplier.
The monetary policy has a central role too. In fact, a monetary policy authority more aggres-
sive on prices, or less aggressive on output, reduces the di¤erential allocation of attention,
and the di¤erential speed in price adjustment to the two shocks. For a given increase in
prices, a more aggressive policy on prices, a larger ; causes real rates to be larger and
current real demand, Ct; to be smaller. Then, everything else being equal, a smaller change
in Ct causes a smaller change in the complete information prot-maximizing price, P^
y
t (z) ; in
(14) : Therefore, the variability of P^ yt (z) is reduced in response to each shock. However, this
27Woodford (2003) suggests a degree of strategic complementarity in price setting, 1 ; between 0.85 and
0.9.
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also reduces the di¤erence in the variability of P^ yt (z) due to the two shocks, which then feed-
backs into the allocation of attention inducing a smaller di¤erence in the attention allocation
across the two shocks. Therefore, a more aggressive monetary policy on prices reduces the
feedback from aggregate prices to rms level complete information prot-maximizing prices,
P^ yt (z) ; inducing lower complementarities in the allocation of attention. A similar argument
holds for a less aggressive monetary policy on output.
In this section, I set  equal to 1:5 and y equal to 0:5. I assume that
a
r
is equal to 1,
and that  is equal to 0:75. I also impose  l equal to 1. This parameterization implies a value
of  equal to 6. The implied degree of strategic complementarity in price setting, 1 ; is 0:5:
At this value the feedback from aggregate prices to rm level complete information optimal
prices, ~ is positive at 0:17. In Figure 2; I plot the price responses to the two shocks under
rational inattention as a fraction of the response under perfect information, and expressed as
a function of . The closer the fraction is to 1, the closer the price responses under rational
inattention are to the ones under complete information. With low values of  the rm will
pay attention only to the technology shocks, "at ; not responding at all to the monetary policy
shocks, "rt . As  increases, the response to the technology shocks converges quickly to the
complete information one, while the one to the monetary policy shocks has a much slower
convergence. In Figure 3; I plot the value of the attention multiplier, ; as a function of
. For small enough values of  there is a corner solution in attention allocation. As 
increases the attention multiplier converges, as expected, to 1; but remains substantially
large for intermediate values. In Figure 4; I plot the attention multiplier ; as a function
of ; setting  equal to 3. For low values of ; and therefore for large degrees of strategic
complementarities in prices, the attention multiplier gets particularly large, pushing towards
a corner solution where all the attention is allocated to the technology shocks. In Figures
5 and 6; I plot the relative responses of prices to shocks to "at and "
r
t as a function of both
 and : A larger  increases the relative responses of prices to both shocks, while a larger
 reduces strategic complementarities in prices, and everything else being equal, increases
price responses to both shocks. It has to be said that a value of  equal to 6 is already
a very large incentive to allocate more information processing resources to the technology
shocks. This reduces the need for a particularly high degree of strategic complementarities
in prices to generate a large di¤erence in the allocation of attention across the two aggregate
shocks. We will see, however, that this will not be the case in the full-blown dynamic
model parameterized in section 5.
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5 The numerical solution to the model
In this section I solve the dynamic model introduced in section 3 with numerical methods. In
subsection 5.1, I describe the numerical routine, in subsection 5.2, I choose the parameters of
the model and in subsection 5.,3 I comment the results of the attention allocation problems
and the implied dynamics of aggregate prices.
5.1 The solution routine
I apply a two-step solution procedure28. In the rst step I formulate a guess for the aggregate
price, P^t; a guess for the aggregate capital-to-labor ratio, k^t; and a guess for the aggregate
intermediate-inputs ratio, x^t; all in log-deviations from the non-stochastic balanced growth
path, and solve for the dynamics of the model economy.
In the second step, I solve for the optimal allocation of attention of each decision maker,
given the processes for the endogenous variables of the model economy obtained in the rst
step. In order to solve each agents attention allocation problem; I take a log-quadratic
expansion of the sum of the discounted expected prots around the non-stochastic balanced
growth path29. In order to save on space, I express the attention allocation problems of the
three decision makers in terms of the variable ^j;t (z) ; which I dene in the following way:
^j;t (z) 
8><>:
P^t (z) ; j = p
k^t (z) ; j = k
x^t (z) ; j = x
:
The attention allocation problem for the decision maker choosing ^j;t (z) at rm z, can be
28See Appendix B for more details.
29As discussed by Sims (2006) p. 161, and Ma´ckoviak and Wiederholt (2007) pp. 35-37, solving the
attention allocation problem through a second order Taylor expansion of the objective function allows for a
good approximation of the solution, as long as departures from complete information are not signicant. At
the value of  considered in this paper, the marginal value of additional information is low at the rm level,
implying potentially small departures from the solution obtained. See Appendix A for more details.
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then expressed as:
min
fszj;tg2S
!jE

^

j;t (z)  ^
y
j;t (z)
2
(27)
s:t:
i) : ^

j;t (z) = E
h
^
y
j;t (z) j stzj
i
; (28)
ii) : I
n
yaj;t (z) ; 
y
rj;t (z)
o
; fszj;tg

 j; (29)
iii) : ^
y
j;t (z) = 
y
aj;t (z) + 
y
rj;t (z) (30)
where !j > 0, ^
y
j;t (z) is the log-deviation from the non-stochastic balanced growth path of
the optimal choice of yj;t (z) in the case of a perfectly informed decision maker j; and ^

j;t (z)
is the projection of ^
y
j;t (z) on the realization of signals for decision maker j; up to time t;
and at rm z. The processes for
n
yaj;t (z) ; 
y
rj;t (z)
o
are obtained from the rst step. I can
then solve the attention allocation problems in (27)  (30), obtaining the implied processes
for aggregate prices, capital-to-labor ratio and intermediate-inputs ratio:
P^ t =
Z 1
0
P^ t (z) dz;
k^t =
Z 1
0
k^t (z) dz;
x^t =
Z 1
0
x^t (z) dz:
I then update the guess and start again from the rst step, iterating until convergence.
5.2 Calibration
I set the discount factor  equal to 0:99. The depreciation rate is equal to 0:025: The
elasticity of value added output with respect to capital, , is assumed to be 0:36, a value
roughly consistent with observed income shares. I set the habit parameter b equal to 0:7, and
the inverse of the Frischs elasticity,  l; equal to 1; similar to Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Linde (2005). I choose  0 so that on the non-stochastic balanced growth path households
supply an amount of labor equal to one. The dynamics of capital adjustment costs around
the non-stochastic balanced growth path are shaped by the second derivative of the capital
adjustment cost function evaluated at steady state, S 00(1): I set the capital adjustment cost
parameter, S 00(1); equal to 5. This is larger than the value estimated by Altig, Christiano,
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Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005), but it is slightly smaller than the one obtained by Smets
and Wouters (2007). The elasticity of the cost of capital utilization,  =
 00(1)
 0(1) , is set to 0:5;
which is similar to the value estimated by Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996). I choose the
elasticity of substitution across goods, ; and the share of intermediate inputs in total costs,
; following Nakamura and Steinsson (2007)30. Therefore, I set  equal to 4; and  equal
to 0:75: From input-output tables relative to the U.S. economy, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2007) estimate that the weighted average of the share of intermediate inputs in revenues is
approximately 56 percent. Then, given the average markup implied by , the steady state
share of intermediate inputs in total costs of production is 0:75.
The parameters in the Taylor rule, r;  and y; are obtained by estimating the rule
31
on the U.S. data from 1959:2 to 2007:2. I estimate the Taylor rule through an e¢ cient
GMM estimator similar to Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000). The instruments set includes
the four lags of rt; t and yt; and the four lags of ination in commodity prices, of M2 growth
and of the spread between the ten years and the three months U.S. treasury bonds32.
Table 3 contains the results of the estimation with associated robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Therefore, r;  and y are set equal to 0:96; 0:12 and 0:2 respectively. The
test of overidentifying restrictions rejects the null at one percent signicance level. The
autocorrelation coe¢ cient, a; and the constant, a; are chosen according to the estimates of
an AR(1) process on an estimate of the U.S. quarterly growth rate in TFP33, from 1959:2 to
2007:2. The estimated autoregressive coe¢ cient cannot be statistically distinguished from
zero, therefore I set a = 0: The standard deviations of the two shocks, a and r; are
obtained respectively from the standard deviation of the U.S. quarterly growth rate in TFP;
and from the standard deviation of the residual of the estimated Taylor rule, over the period
30Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001) nd that markups vary a great deal across rms. The value of 
I choose implies a markup similar to the mean markup estimated by Berry et al. (1995) but slightly below
the median markup found by Nevo (2001). Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate elasticities of demand for
a large array of disaggregated products using trade data. They report a median elasticity of demand below
3. Also, Burstein and Hellwig (2006) estimate an elasticity of demand near 5 using a menu cost model.
Midrigan (2005) uses = 3 while Golosov and Lucas (2006) use = 7.
31The equation I estimate is:
rt = c+ rrt 1 + t + yyt + u
r
t ;
where rt is the Federal Fund rate, t is the log-di¤erence in the GDP price deator, and yt is the deviation
of the growth rate of output from a linear trend.
32Quarterly measures were computed averaging over months.
33Fernald (2007) estimates a quarterly series for the U.S. TFP growth rate trough a Solow residual ac-
counting technique similar to Basu, Fernald, Kimball (2004).
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1959:2-2007:2: The standard deviation of the U.S. quarterly growth rate in TFP is about 4
times the standard deviation of the residual from the Taylor rule34. In mapping the estimated
standard deviation of the TFP growth rate to the standard deviation of the technology shock
in the model, I have to adjust for the fact that the TFP growth rate has been estimated
according to a model with a value added production function with no intermediate inputs35.
Therefore, I need to scale the standard deviation of the estimated TFP growth rate by 1 .
Since  has been set equal to 0:75, the ratio of standard deviations of shocks in the model,
a
r
; is set equal to 1: Finally the total information processing capabilities at the rm level, ;
is chosen so that in equilibrium the loss each rm faces from not being completely informed
is a relatively small fraction of prots. Hence I choose  equal to 4:
5.3 Results
In Figure 7; I plot the responses of ination and output to a one basis point shock to "a and
"r in the model under complete information,  ! +1: Not surprisingly, almost all of the
adjustment in prices to "a takes place in two quarters, while all of the adjustment in prices
following the shock to "r takes place in the period of impact of the shock. Under complete
information, in fact, a one basis point positive shock to "a reduces prices by about 12 basis
points on impact, and about 11 basis points after two quarters. A one basis point negative
shock to "r increases prices by approximately 8:5 basis points along with the shock. Since
the relative standard deviation of "a and "r is set equal to 1; and given that the impact of a
technology shock on the complete information aggregate price level is larger than the impact
of an equally sized monetary policy shock, there is an initial incentive for the rm to pay
more attention to technology shocks than to monetary policy shocks, but such an incentive
is relatively small. Under complete information, in fact, the long-run impact of a one basis
point shock to "a on prices is about 30 percent larger than the long-run impact of a one basis
point shock to "r: Intuitively this initial incentive is the dynamic counterpart of the variable
 I derived in the static version of the model. Therefore, if this model has to generate a
large di¤erential in the response of prices to the two shocks, it must come from the attention
multiplier. Given that the monetary policy authority is substantially more aggressive on
output than it is on ination, and that the share of intermediate inputs in total costs, ; is
34I obtain similar results if I use the standard deviations of the estimated TFP and monetary policy shocks
from the VAR.
35See Appendix D for details.
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0:75, the feedback from aggregate prices to rm level complete information prot-maximizing
price, P^ yt (z) ; is substantial, inducing a large attention multiplier. In Figure 8; I plot the
impulse responses of output and ination in the model with limited information processing
capabilities, with  equal to 4. Prices adjust quickly to the "a shock, with almost all of the
adjustment taking place in the rst two quarters. In contrast, prices adjust very sluggishly to
the "r shock, inducing a large real e¤ect of the monetary policy shock. The response of output
to the "r shock is very persistent and takes many quarters to converge to zero. The optimal
allocation of  across the di¤erent decision makers is such that 50 percent of  is allocated to
price decision maker, 33 percent is allocated to the intermediate-inputs ratio decision maker
and the remaining to the capital-to-labor ratio decision maker. The price decision maker
allocates almost all of its information processing resources to the technology shocks. The
other two decision makers allocate similar resources to the technology and monetary policy
shocks, as the capital-to-labor ratio and the intermediate-inputs ratio have similar impacts
across the two shocks on the variability of prots. At equilibrium the marginal value of
additional information processing resources at the rm level is small. Each rm faces a loss
that is in the order of 1/1000 of its discounted sum of non-stochastic balanced growth path
prots, where the loss is computed relative to the case the rm had complete information,
!1; and everything else being equal.
6 Complementarities, monetary policy and signals struc-
ture
In this section I investigate the roles of strategic complementarity in price setting, monetary
policy and the role of restrictions on the signals space for the results obtained above. Lastly,
I discuss potential extensions and shortcomings.
6.1 The role of complementarities
I reduce the share of intermediate inputs in total steady state costs, ; from 0:75 to 0:5. A
value of  equal to 0:75 implied in section 4 a value of  equal to 0:5. With  dropping to 0:5;
 increases to 1; and the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting is substantially
reduced: To have an idea of how low complementarities are in this model, it helps to consider
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the fact that Woodford (2003) recommends a value of  between 0:15 and 0:1 in models of
sticky prices.
With a smaller degree of strategic complementarity in price setting there are two e¤ects
that reduce the di¤erence in the allocation of attention across the two shocks for the price
setter. The rst is a direct e¤ect that goes through the reallocation of attention at the price
setter level: smaller complementarities in price setting induce smaller complementarities in
the allocation of attention across price setters, and, everything else being equal, reduces the
di¤erential in the allocation of attention across shocks for each price setter. The second e¤ect
relates to the reallocation of information processing resources, ; at the rm level: smaller
complementarities in price setting induce a larger variability of aggregate prices in response
to aggregate shocks, and, everything else being equal, increase the incentive to allocate more
resources to process information about prices than to process information about the capital-
to-labor ratio and the intermediate-inputs ratio. At the equilibrium, 75 percent of total
information processing resources, ; is allocated to the price setter, 16 percent is allocated to
the intermediate-inputs ratio decision maker and the remaining to the capital-to-labor ratio
decision maker. The price setter allocates 57 percent of its attention to technology. Therefore
the di¤erential in attention allocation across the two shocks is substantially smaller for this
decision maker relative to the case with larger complementairity in price setting. Capital-
to-labor and intermediate-inputs ratios will not be very responsive to the monetary policy
shocks, pushing the respective decision makers to allocate almost all of their attention to the
technology shocks. In Figure 9; I plot the responses of ination to a one basis point shock
to "a and "r; in the model with and without limited information processing capabilities.
Now, the adjustment of prices to "r takes place in two quarters, and therefore, the real e¤ect
of the monetary policy shocks are small and ination is not very persistent. Most of the
adjustment in prices to "a takes place in two quarters, similar to the benchmark calibration.
Since a
r
is set equal to 2; the initial impact of a one basis point shock to "a on prots is
about 30 percent larger than the initial impact of a one basis point shock to "r; and therefore
the price setters initial incentive to allocate more attention to technology is similar to the
benchmark calibration36. However, with low complementarities in price setting, the initial
incentive does not get amplied and the di¤erence in the allocation of attention across the
two shocks will be small.
36By the same argument in section 5:2; lowering  to 0:5; causes the relative standard deviation of shocks,
a
r
; to be set equal to 2.
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6.2 The role of monetary policy
In this paragraph I modify the parameterization of the monetary policy rule dened in (5) :
First, I decrease y from 0:2 to 0:1, making the monetary authority less aggressive on output
growth. A less aggressive monetary policy on output growth a¤ects the speed of adjustment
of prices to the two aggregate shocks mainly through three channels. The rst two channels
have to do with the allocation of attention at the price-setter level, the third channel is related
to the allocation of attention decision at the rm level. A less aggressive monetary policy
on output growth, reduces the variability of prices following technology shocks, therefore
reducing the initial incentive to allocate attention to these shocks. The drop in y is so large
that the price setter has an initial incentive to allocate more attention to monetary policy
shocks, being prices relatively more volatile to those shocks than to technology shocks under
complete information. The second impact of the lower y is on the price setters allocation
of attention that takes place through a lower attention multiplier: a less aggressive monetary
policy on output growth reduces the feedback from aggregate prices to rms level complete
information prot-maximizing prices, inducing lower complementarities in the allocation of
attention. Finally there is a reallocation of information processing resources at the rm
level: more resource devoted to process information on the variability of prices to monetary
policy shocks cause prices to be more responsive to such shocks, and, as a consequence, the
capital-to-labor ratio and the intermediate-inputs ratio to have a smaller variability following
monetary policy shocks, as the economy dynamics following these shocks are closer to the
complete information counterparts. It follows that the price decision becomes relatively more
important than the other two decisions. Therefore more information processing capabilities
are allocated to the price setter. In fact, 76 percent of  goes to the price setter, 17 percent
goes to the intermediate-inputs decision maker, and the residual goes to the capital-to-labor
ratio decision maker. The price setter allocates 58 percent of her information processing
capabilities to monetary policy shocks, and 42 percent to technology shocks. Unlike the
benchmark specication, there is no substantial amplication in the di¤erential allocation
of attention in favor of the monetary policy shocks. In Figure 10; I plot the responses of
ination to a one basis point shock to "a and "r; in the model with and without limited
information processing capabilities. The speed of adjustment of prices to the two aggregate
shocks is similar, with prices adjusting slightly more quickly to "r than to "a:
In the second modication to the parameterization of the Taylor rule, I increase  from
0:12 to 0:3; holding the other parameters at the values of the benchmark calibration. This
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induces a more aggressive monetary policy on ination, which reduces, everything else being
equal, the variability of prices to any shock. The impact on the allocation of attention is
similar to the impact caused by a decrease in the degree of strategic complementarity in price
setting. The rst direct e¤ect goes through the reallocation of attention at the price setter
level: a more aggressive monetary policy on ination reduces the feedback from aggregate
prices to rms level complete information prot-maximizing prices, inducing lower comple-
mentarities in the allocation of attention, and therefore more attention devoted to monetary
policy shocks relative to the benchmark parameterization. The second, indirect, e¤ect re-
lates to the reallocation of information processing resources at the rm level: when price
setters allocate more resources to process information on the variability of prices following
monetary policy shocks, aggregate prices become more responsive to such shocks, and, as a
consequence, the capital-to-labor ratio and the intermediate-inputs ratio become less respon-
sive to monetary policy shocks. It follows that the price setter is allocated more resources
relative to the benchmark parameterization. In contrast to the case in which I changed y; a
change in  has no substantial impact on the initial incentive for the price setter to allocate
more attention to technology shocks. As in the benchmark parameterization, there is an ini-
tial incentive to allocate more resources to process information about technology shocks, but
here there is no large amplication of this incentive through the attention multiplier. At the
solution, the price setter allocates 56 percent of her information processing capabilities to
the technology shocks. Similarly to the case of a less aggressive monetary policy on output
growth, the capital-to-labor and intermediate-inputs ratios will be not very responsive to
the monetary policy shocks, and hence the respective decision makers will allocate almost
all of their attention to technology shocks. In equilibrium, 64 percent of  is allocated to the
price setter. In Figure 11; aggregate prices have similar speeds of adjustments to the two
aggregate shocks.
The ability of the model to generate the di¤erential response in prices depends, then, on
the fact that the monetary policy, estimated over the sample period 1959:2-2007:2, has been
relative more aggressive on output growth than it has been on ination. When I estimate
the same policy rule on the sub-sample37 from 1979:3, to 2007:2, I obtain that the monetary
37This sub-sample includes period from the Volckers presidency to 2007.
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policy has been relatively more aggressive on ination than it has been on output growth38.
In such a case the model would imply a much smaller amplication of the di¤erential in
attention allocation. However, this does not mean necessarily the model would not capture
the di¤erential response on prices in that sub-sample: the estimated standard deviation of
the TFP shock is, in fact, about 8.5 times the estimated standard deviation of the monetary
policy shock over that sub-sample. The di¤erential response of prices would, then, be driven
more by the relative standard deviations of the shocks and less by the attention multiplier.
6.3 The role of the signal structure
So far I have assumed that attending to technology and monetary policy shocks are separate
activities. This means that each decision maker is always able to distinguish between the two
types of shocks. In this section I investigate what happens in the static version of the model
of section 4; when I remove the independency assumption in (12): Specically, suppose that
the price-setter at rm z can choose signals of the form:
szp;t =
8>>><>>>:
C^t + cu
c
z;t
P^t + pu
p
z;t
R^t + ru
r
z;t
L^t + lu
l
z;t
; (31)
where ujt is assumed to be iid and normally distributed with zero mean and unitary variance:
In contrast to the signals in (17)   (18) ; the signals in (31) have the property that each
signal contains information about both technology and monetary policy shocks. This signal
structure conveys the idea that each decision maker processes information coming from
signals based on realizations of variables that are actually available in the real world.
The price setter at rm z solves the attention problem in (19), by choosing the precision
of each signal, j; j = c; p; r; l; in (31) ; and subject to the information ow constraint:
p  I
n
P^ yt (z)
o
; fszp;tg

: (32)
38The estimated parameters on the sub-sample 1979:3-2007:2 are:
r = 0:86
 = 0:37
y = 0:14
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In Figure 12; I plot the price responses to the two shocks under rational inattention,
and relative to perfect information as a function of . For large values of information
processing capabilities, ; rms make very small mistakes in setting their prices relative to
the complete information optimal choices. In this economy, the complete information prot-
maximizing price for each rm; P^ yt (z) ; coincides with the aggregate price, since, except
that for the realization of the signals, rms are identical. Therefore, for large ; the error
coming from limited information processing capabilities is relatively small and the aggregate
price is a very good statistic for the optimal rm level price. Firms will basically acquire
and process information almost only on aggregate prices. As  decreases, the errors rms
make in setting prices increase, and the aggregate price becomes a less valuable statistic for
the optimal price. Hence rms will increase the precision of the other signals relative to
the one for the aggregate price. In particular, they will process relatively more information
about aggregate demand, which appears directly in the equation for complete information
prot-maximizing price in (14) : There is, however, a characteristic of aggregate demand that
makes it very di¤erent from aggregate prices: while the covariance of aggregate prices with
P^ yt (z) is positive independently of the type of shock, the sign of the covariance of aggregate
demand with P^ yt (z) depends on the type of shock. In particular, demand is negatively
correlated with P^ yt (z), conditioning on the technology shock, while it is positively correlated
with P^ yt (z), conditioning on the monetary policy shock. Since a rm faces, on average, a
larger loss when it is uninformed about the technology shocks than when it is uninformed
about the monetary policy shocks, it decides to respond with a decrease in prices to an
increase in demand. Therefore, for low values of k; aggregate prices are less informative and
hence receive a relatively lower weight while more attention is devoted to aggregate demand,
causing prices to respond with the wrong sign to the monetary policy shocks: prices raise
after a positive shock to "rt .
6.4 Final considerations and extensions
The household side of the economy has been modeled without any friction. Rationally
inattentive households would, most likely, not reduce the ability of the model I propose in
accounting for the di¤erence in the speed of adjustment of prices to the two aggregate shocks.
In the case in which households are monopolistic suppliers of factors, limited information
processing capabilities on them would introduce inertia in the response of factor prices to
shocks. This would have an asymmetric impact on the response of prices to the two aggregate
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shocks. After a monetary policy shock, less responsive factor prices mean less responsive
nominal marginal costs, and, therefore, less responsive aggregate prices when everything
else is equal. After a technology shock, less responsive factor prices would imply more
responsive nominal marginal costs. This is because if factor prices react less, real marginal
costs would move more, as they are a¤ected directly by technology. In fact, the latter
reduces the impact on real marginal costs of technology as it moves in the opposite direction.
Therefore, rationally inattentive households could, in principle, also amplify the di¤erence in
the allocation of attention of the price setter across technology and monetary policy shocks.
Understanding how big this e¤ect is, is left for future research.
There is a role for information sharing at the rm level. If one decision maker was taking
all the decisions at the rm level, therefore pooling information processing capabilities, the
outcome would be at least as good as the one obtained by having three separate decision
makers. Although it might not be completely realistic having only one agent taking all the
decisions at the rm level, it would, most likely, not change substantially the results obtained
in this paper in terms of di¤erential speed of price adjustment to the two aggregate shocks.
The reason is that the price decision is much more important for the rm that the other two
decisions. In fact, the weight in the component of the loss function due to errors in pricing
is an order of magnitude larger than the weights on the components of the loss function due
to errors in input choices. However, there might also be other e¤ects going on and further
research is eventually needed on this dimension.
7 Conclusions
I have shown that a model in which price setters have limited information processing capabil-
ities provides a natural explanation for the di¤erence in the speed of adjustment of prices to
neutral technology shocks and monetary policy shocks. Price setters allocate more attention
to technology shocks because it is relatively more costly to be uninformed about those shocks
than about monetary policy shocks. Therefore aggregate prices respond quicker to technol-
ogy shocks than to monetary policy shocks. The result is driven by the large di¤erence in the
allocation of attention by the price setter across the two shocks. The large di¤erence in the
allocation of attention is, in great proportion, generated by the interaction of complementar-
ities in price setting with limited information processing capabilities. Complementarities in
price setting induce complementarities in the optimal allocation of attention: any price setter
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at each rm has an incentive to acquire more information on the same variables other rms
are, on average, more informed about. Since there is an upper bound on the average ow
of information processed by each decision maker, when more attention is paid to technology
shocks, less attention is necessarily paid to monetary policy shocks.
The monetary policy authority plays a major role in the determination of the di¤erential
speed of price adjustment to the two aggregate shocks. A more aggressive monetary policy
on ination, or a less aggressive policy on output, reduces the multiplicative e¤ect on the
di¤erence in the speed of price adjustment to technology and monetary policy shocks coming
from the allocation of attention.
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9 Appendix A: The solution to the rational inattention
problem
In this appendix I state the optimization problem for each of the three choices the rm has to
make and take a second-order Taylor expansion around the non-stochastic balanced growth
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path.
The price setter problem is choosing P t (z) so to maximize (8) and fszp;tg so to maximize
(10) subject to (9). Similarly, the decision maker for the capital-to-labor ratio choses kt (z)
in each period t to solves:
max
kt(z)
E
" 1X
=t
 (P (z) ; k (z) ; x (z) ;  ) j stkp
#
; (33)
and chooses the optimal signal process fszk;tg so to solve:
max
fszk;tg2S
E
" 1X
t=0
t (Pt (z) ; k

t (z) ; xt (z) ; t)
#
(34)
s:t: (35)
k  I
n
kya;t (z) ; k
y
r;t (z)
o
; fszk;tg

(36)
where
n
kya;t (z) ; k
y
r;t (z)
o
is the vector of stochastic processes for the complete information op-
timal responses to the two aggregate shocks. Lastly, the decision maker for the intermediate-
inputs ratio sets xt (z) in each period t to solve:
max
xt(z)
E
" 1X
=t
 (P (z) ; k (z) ; x (z) ;  ) j stxp
#
: (37)
and chooses the optimal signal process fszx;tg in period zero, so to solve:
max
fszx;tg2S
E
" 1X
t=0
t (Pt (z) ; kt (z) ; x

t (z) ; t)
#
(38)
s:t: (39)
x  I
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xya;t (z) ; x
y
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o
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(40)
where
n
xya;t (z) ; x
y
r;t (z)
o
is the vector of stochastic processes for the complete information
optimal responses to the two aggregate shocks.
Non-stationary variables are scaled in the following way: ct  Ct
A
(1 )(1 )
t 1
; yt  Yt
A
(1 )(1 )
t 1
;
wt  Wt
A
(1 )(1 )
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(1 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; Ht  Kt
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(1 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)(1 )
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s
t  xt
A
(1 )2(1 )
t 1
; at  AtAt 1 : The other (stationary) endogenous variables are
39
Rt; r
k
t ; t; t; ut where tt is the Lagrangian multiplier on the capital accumulation equation,
and hence t is the real price of installed capital. I dene a variable with a hat to be the log
deviation from its steady state, hence xt = ln (xt)  ln (x) : Dene the real prot function of
rm z at time t as:
 (Pt (z) ; kt (z) ; xt (z) ; Yt; Pt; At;Wt; rt) 

Pt (z)
Pt
  Q (kt (z) ; xt (z) ;Wt; rt)
At

Pt (z)
Pt
 
Yt;
(41)
where Yt is aggregate demand; kt (z)  Kt(z)Lt(z) is the capital-to-labor ratio at rm z, and
xt (z)  Xt(z)Kt(z)Lt(z)1  is the ratio of intermediate inputs to the composite input derived from
capital and labor. Q (kt (z) ; xt (z) ;Wt; rt) is given by:
Q (kt (z) ; xt (z) ;Wt; rt) 
 
rkt kt (z)
1  xt (z)
  +Wtkt (z)
  xt (z)
  + xt (z)
1  : (42)
I then construct the discounted prot function, multiplying the prot function by the (scaled)
discount factor, t:
~

Pt (z)
Pt
; kst (z) ; x
s
t (z) ; Yt; At;Wt; rt; t

 t (Pt (z) ; kt (z) ; xt (z) ; Yt; Pt; At;Wt; rt)
A
(1 )(1 )
t 1
where qt =
Q(kt(z);xt(z);Wt;rt)
A
(1 )(1 )
t 1
: Hence I express the prot function ~ as a function of variables
in log-deviations from the balanced growth path:


P^t (z)  P^t; k^st (z) ; x^st (z) ; y^t; a^t; w^t; r^t; ^t

 ~

eP^t(z) P^t ; kek^
s
t ; xex^
s
t ; yey^t ; ea^t ; wew^t ; rer^t ; e^t;

:
I then take a second order Taylor expansion of  around the non-stochastic balanced growth
path:


P^t (z)  P^t; k^st (z) ; x^st (z) ; y^t; a^t; w^t; r^t; ^t

  (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0) + 1

P^t (z)  P^t

+ 2k^
s
t (z) + 3x^
s
t (z) + 4y^t + 5a^t + 6w^t + 7r^t + 8^t +
+
11
2

P^t (z)  P^t
2
+
22
2
k^st (z)
2 +
33
2
x^st (z)
2 +
44
2
y^2t +
55
2
a^2t +
66
2
w^2t +
77
2
r^2t +
88
2
^
2
t +
+12

P^t (z)  P^t

k^st (z) + 13

P^t (z)  P^t

x^st (z) + 14

P^t (z)  P^t

y^t + 15

P^t (z)  P^t

a^t
+16

P^t (z)  P^t

w^t + 17

P^t (z)  P^t

r^t + 18

P^t (z)  P^t

^t +
+23k^
s
t (z) x^
s
t (z) + 24k^
s
t (z) y^t + 25k^
s
t (z) a^t + 26k^
s
t (z) w^t + 27k^
s
t (z) r^t + 28k^
s
t (z) ^t +
+34x^
s
t (z) y^t + 35x^
s
t (z) a^t + 36x^
s
t (z) w^t + 37x^
s
t (z) r^t + 38x^
s
t (z) ^t +
+45y^ta^t + 46y^tw^t + 47y^tr^t + 48y^t^t + 56a^tw^t + 57a^tr^t + 58a^t^t +
+67w^tr^t + 68w^t^t + 78r^t^t:
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In order to simplify further the problem, I subtract from the second order Taylor expansion
for prots under incomplete information, the equivalent expression when the decision maker
has complete information, everything else being equal. For example in the case of the price
setter:


P^ t (z)  P^t; k^t (z) ; x^t (z) ; y^t; a^t; w^t; r^t; ^t

  

P^ yt (z)  P^t; k^t (z) ; x^t (z) ; y^t; a^t; w^t; r^t; ^t

:
The latter does not inuence the attention allocation problem. Maximizing the discounted
sum of prots relative to the optimal signal structure is equivalent to maximize it in devia-
tions from the value under complete information, as the latter is independent of the signal
choice. Therefore the objective for the attention allocation problem of the price setter is
approximated by:
E
1X
t=0
h


P^ t (z)  P^t; k^st (z) ; x^st (z) ; y^t; a^t; w^t; r^t; ^t

  

P^ yt (z)  P^t; k^st (z) ; x^st (z) ; y^t; a^t; w^t; r^t; ^t
i
  !1E

P^ t (z)  P^ yt (z)
2
where !1 =
Y ( 1)
2(1 ) ; and where I have used the results from the second order Taylor expansion
and the fact that:
i) : E1 = 0; (43)
ii) : E
 
11

P^ yt (z)  P^t

+ 12k^
s
t (z) + 13x^
s
t (z)+
14y^t + 15a^t + 16w^t + 17r^t + 18^t
!
= 0: (44)
From (44) ; and computing the values of (11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17; 18) from (41) ; it is
possible to show that the complete information optimal log-price coincides with the log-
deviation of aggregate nominal marginal costs:
P^ yt (z) = P^t + q^t   a^t
= P^t + (1  )
 
r^kt + (1  ) w^t
  a^t:
The attention allocation problem for the price setter reduces to:
min
fszp;tg2S
!1E

P^ t (z)  P^ yt (z)
2
(45)
s:t:
i) : P^ t (z) = E
h
P^ yt (z) j stzp
i
;
ii) : p  I
n
P^ yat (z) ; P^
y
rt (z)
o
; fszp;tg

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where the optimal choice of prices, P^ t (z) ; is a projection of the complete information price
over the signal realization up to time t. This is due to the fact that the objective function is
quadratic. It can be proven that the objective function is well dened in the sense that at
the optimal solution it is nite:
Similarly, it can be shown that the objective in the attention allocation problem for the
capital labor ratio choice can be approximated with a second order Taylor expansion by:
 !2E

k^t (z)  k^yt (z)
2
where !2 =
Y ( 1)
2(1 ))
(1 )

: The complete information optimal choice for the capital labor ratio
depends on the relative ratio of real wages to rental rates:
kyt (z) =

1  
Wt
rkt
;
then by log-linearizing the above expression:
k^yt (z) = W^t   r^kt ;
Then the attention allocation problem is:
min
fszk;tg2S
!2E

k^t (z)  k^yt (z)
2
(46)
s:t:
i) : k^t (z) = E
h
k^yt (z) j stzk
i
;
ii) : k  I
n
k^yat (z) ; k^
y
rt (z)
o
; fszk;tg

:
Finally, the objective in the attention allocation problem for the intermediate-inputs ratio
to the other factors, can be approximated with a second order Taylor expansion by:
 !3E

x^t (z)  x^yt (z)
2
where !3 =
Y ( 1)
2(1 )
(1 )

: The optimal intermediate-inputs ratio under complete information
is given by:
xyt (z) =

1  
 
rkt

W 1 t
 (1  )1  ;
and then by log-linearizing the expression above I obtain :
x^yt (z) = r^
k
t + (1  ) W^t:
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Then the attention allocation problem for the production department is:
min
fszx;tg2S
!3E

x^t (z)  x^yt (z)
2
(47)
s:t:
i) : x^t (z) = E
h
x^yt (z) j stzx
i
;
ii) : x  I
n
x^yat (z) ; x^
y
rt (z)
o
; fszx;tg

:
Notice that in the information ows for all three problems, I have replaced the levels with
the logs. Given that this is a monotonic transformation the value of the information ow
will be unchanged, and hence the level of uncertainty of the two processes is the same.
9.1 Appendix B: the solution routine
This is a two step procedure. In the rst step the endogenous variables are scaled, and the
rst order conditions are log-linearized around the non-stochastic balanced growth path for
given guesses for fgp;tg, fgk;tg and fgx;tg ; obtaining a linear state space representation. In
the second step the rational inattention problems are solved and the guesses are veried and
updated.
9.1.1 Step 1
There are fourteen endogenous variables

ct; yt; wt; it; Ht; ~Ht; k
s
t ; t; x^
s
t ; Rt; r
k
t ; t; t; ut

. Af-
ter log-linearizing the scaled model around its balanced growth path, I obtain the fourteen
equations that dene the equilibrium. Three of these equations are directly liked to the ratio-
nal inattention problems. The equations directly involving the rational inattention problems
are the one dening aggregate prices, the one relative to the aggregate capital-to-labor ratio,
and the one relative to the intermediate-inputs ratio. These problems are solved in step 2,
but in step 1 I give a guess for aggregate prices, the ratio of aggregate capital to labor, and
the ratio of intermediate-inputs to capital and labor. Formally, the three guesses take the
43
form of the sum of stationary MA (T ) processes39:
gp;t  gap;t + grp;t =
T 1X
l=0
ap;l"
a
t l +
T 1X
l=0
rp;l"
r
t l; (48)
gk;t  gak;t + grk;t =
T 1X
l=0
ak;l"
a
t l +
T 1X
l=0
rk;l"
r
t l; (49)
gx;t  gax;t + grx;t =
T 1X
l=0
ax;l"
a
t l +
T 1X
l=0
rx;l"
r
t l: (50)
The equilibrium condition that denes the aggregate price is:
P^t =
Z 1
0
E
h
P^ yt (z) j stzp
i
dz;
which I express as:
P^t = P^
y
t + gp;t;
which implies that the equilibrium price can be expressed as the price that would prevail
under complete information for the decision maker, plus a process that depends on the
realizations of the only two exogenous variables in the model. The condition above can
then be manipulated to obtain an expression that does not depend on price level. This is
important as the price level is not stationary. Therefore:
P^t = P^
y
t (z) + gp;t
P^t = P^t + (1  )
 
rkt + (1  ) w^t
  a^t + gp;t
0 = (1  )  rkt + (1  ) w^t  a^t + gp;t (51)
where the second equation derives from the denition of P^ yt (z). In a similar way I obtain a
condition for aggregate capital-to-labor ratio,
k^t =
Z 1
0
E
h
k^yt (z) j stzk
i
dz;
and express it as:
k^t = k^
y
t (z) + gk;t
= W^t   r^kt + gk;t;
k^st = w^t   r^kt + gk;t: (52)
39Stationarity comes from the fact that these di¤erences converge to zero after a one time shock.
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Finally, the condition dening the aggregate intermediate-inputs ratio is given by:
x^t =
Z 1
0
E
h
x^yt (z) j stzx
i
dz;
and it is expressed as:
x^t = x^
y
t (z) + gx;t
= (1  ) W^t + r^kt + gx;t:
x^st = (1  ) w^t + r^kt + gx;t (53)
I then formulate the guess for the 6T parameters,

ap;l; 
r
p;l; 
a
k;l; 
r
k;l; 
a
x;l; 
r
x;l
	T 1
l=0
, for
a large T . Once this is done, I can solve the model, represented by the sixteen equations,
three of which are (51) ; (49) ; (53) ;and obtain a state space representation. In particular I
can obtain the responses of P^ yt (z), k^
y
t (z) and x^
y
t (z) to the two shocks, which is all I need to
solve the rational inattention problems:
P^ yt (z)  P^ yat (z) + P^ yrt (z) =
T 1X
l=0
ap;l"
a
t l +
T 1X
l=0
rp;l"
r
t l; (54)
k^yt (z)  k^yat (z) + k^yrt (z) =
T 1X
l=0
ak;l"
a
t l +
T 1X
l=0
rk;l"
r
t l; (55)
x^yt (z)  x^yat (z) + x^yrt (z) =
T 1X
l=0
ax;l"
a
t l +
T 1X
l=0
rx;l"
r
t l (56)
9.1.2 Step 2
In the second step I solve for the attention allocations problems. In order to save on space, I
express the attention allocation problems of the three decision makers in terms of the variable
^j;t (z) ; which I dene in the following way:
^j;t (z) 
8><>:
P^t (z) ; j = p
k^t (z) ; j = k
x^t (z) ; j = x
:
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Given the assumption of independent signals in (12) ; I can express the attention problem
for the choice of signals for decision maker j as:
min
(fszja;tg;fszjr;tg)2S
!jE

^
y
ja;t (z)  ^

ja;t (z)
2
+ !jE

^
y
jr;t (z)  ^

jr;t (z)
2
(57)
s:t:
i) : ^

ja;t (z) = E
h
^
y
ja;t (z) j stzja
i
;
ii) : ^

jr;t (z) = E
h
^
y
jr;t (z) j stzjr
i
;
iii) : j  I
n
^
y
ja;t (z)
o
; fszja;tg

+ I

^
y
jr;t (z) ; fszjr;tg

;
I can then solve separately six attention allocation problems, two for each of the three decision
makers, as the objective functions are separable, and the information ow constraints are
additive. One can show that the objective function in (57) is nite at a solution. One
can also show that, in this framework, I
n
^
y
ja;t (z)
o
; fszja;tg

= I
n
^
y
ja;t (z)
o
; fszja;tg

:
Also, Ma´ckoviak and Wiederholt (2007) show that the attention allocation problem can be
solved directly in terms of conditional expectations. I report only the solution procedure
to attention allocation to shock f"at g for choice j. The procedure for f"rtg is identical.
Therefore, consider the optimal attention allocation for ^ja;t (z) relative to the f"at g process.
The signal and the optimal price process
n
^
y
ja;t (z)
o
; fszpa;tg

are normally distributed and
the variable to process information about is univariate. I can then express the attention
allocation problems as:
min
(faj;lg;fbj;lg)
!j lim
T!1
"
2a
T 1X
l=0
 
~aj;l   aj;l
2
+
T 1X
l=0
~b2j;l
#
s:t:
i) : ja  I
n
^
y
ja;t (z)
o
;
n
^

ja;t (z)
o
;
ii) : ^

ja;t (z) = E
h
^
y
ja;t (z) j stzja
i
 lim
T!1
"
T 1X
l=0
aj;l"
a
t l +
T 1X
l=0
bj;lu
a
t l
#
;
ii) : ut l iid s N(0; 1);
iv) : ~aj;l =
lX
i=0
aj;l; ~bj;l =
lX
i=0
bj;l;
where the information ow is dened by:
I
n
^
y
ja;t (z)
o
;
n
^

ja;t (z)
o
= lim
T!1
1
T

0:5 log2
(2e)T

^
y
ja;t
  0:5 log2 (2e)T
^yja;tj^ja;t ;
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where 

^
y
ja;t
is the variance-covariance matrix of
n
^
y
ja;t
o
and 

^
y
ja;tj^

ja;t
is the variance-
covariance matrix of
n
^
y
ja;t
o
conditional on
n
^

ja;t
o
: Both are stationary objects. The
implied process for ^t;ja is then
^ja;t = lim
T!1
T 1X
l=0
aj;l"
a
t l:
In order to solve the model, I x a large T and solve the model for that T: I can then update
the guess in the following way:
a
0
j;l = (1  {) aj;l + {
 
~aj;l   aj;l

;
where { is a constant chosen small enough to ensure convergence. Notice that at a solution,
~aj;l   aj;l = aj;l:
In the same way I solve for the process f"rtg and update for the corresponding guesses. Once
I have all the new guesses, I start again from step 1 and iterate until convergence.
9.2 Appendix C: Solution to the static model
The log-linearized equations dening the solution to the static version in section 4 of the
model are:
Y^t = (1  ) C^t + X^t; (58)
C^t =  R^t   P^t; (59)
R^t = P^t + yC^t + "
r
t ; (60)
Y^t = X^t + (1  ) L^t + "at ; (61)
W^t =  lL^t + C^t; (62)
X^t = L^t + W^t; (63)
P^ yt (z) = P^t + (1  ) W^t   "at : (64)
By substituting (58) into (61) I get an expression for hours worked, L^t = C^t   "
a
t
1  ; which I
then substitute into (62) ; to get an expression for real wages as a function of demand and
technology, W^t = (1 +  l) C^t    l "
a
t
1  : Substituting the latter into (64) gives:
P^ yt (z) = P^t + C^t   (1 +  l) "at :
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where  = (1 +  l) (1  ) : Using equations (59) and (60) ; I obtain an expression for C^t as
a function of P^t and "rt ; C^t =   1+1+y P^t 
"rt
1+y
: Finally, using the last result and the guess for
aggregate prices, P^t = r"
r
t + a"
a
t ; I obtain an expression for complete information optimal
prices as a function of the shocks only:
P^ yt (z) =

1   1 + 
1 + y

r + #r

"rt +

1   1 + 
1 + y

a + #a

"at ;
#a    (1 +  l) ;
#r    (1 +  l) (1  )
1
1 + y
:
I can then solve the price setter attention problem expressing it as:
min
fszp;tg2S
!1E

P^ t (z)  P^ yt
2
s:t:
i) : P^ yt (z) =

1   1 + 
1 + y

r + #r

"rt +

1   1 + 
1 + y

a + #a

"at ;
ii) : P^ t (z) = E
h
P^ yt (z) j szpt
i
;
iii) : szprt = (r + #r) "
r
t + u
r
zt
iv) : szpat = (a + #a) "
a
t + u
a
zt
v) : urzt ? uazt; uazt~N(0; 2a); urzt~N(0; 2r)
vi) :
1
2
log2

1 +
2a
2a

+
1
2
log2

1 +
2r
2r

 p
Using the constraints (i)  (v), and solving for the unconditional expectation, the objective
the problem becomes:
min
2a
2a
0;2r
2r
0
!1
264

~a + #a
2
2a
1 + 
2
a
2a
+

~r + #r
2
2r
1 + 
2
r
2r
375
s:t:
i :

1 +
2a
2a

1 +
2r
2r

 22:
where ~ = 1   1+
1+y
: The interior solution to the problem above is:
1 +
2a
2a
= 2
~a + #a
~r + #r
a
r
; (65)
1 +
2r
2r
= 2
~r + #r
~a + #a
r
a
: (66)
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Then solving for the xed point, a and r; and substituting the result into (65)   (66)
implies:
1 +
2a
2a
= 2
1  ~

1 + 2
 


1  ~ (1 + 2 ) ;
1 +
2r
2r
=
2

1  ~ (1 + 2 )
1  ~

1 + 2
 

 :
The conditions on parameters for an interior solution are obtained by imposing
2j
2j
 0; and
are given by: (
~  1 
1

2 
1 2 2 if   1
~  1 2 
1 2 2 if  > 1
Then, the corner solutions for a and r are:8<: (a; r) =

#a
1 2 2
1 ~(1 2 2) ; 0

if ~ > 1 2
 
1 2 2 and  > 1
(a; r) =

0; #r
1 2 2
1 ~(1 2 2)

if ~ >
1  1

2 
1 2 2 and   1
9.3 Appendix D
The production function Fernald (2007) uses to estimate the TFP growth rate through a
Solow residual is:
Y vat = Zt (Ktut)
 L1 t
where Y vat is value added output, and the measure of labor takes into account of the quality
and e¤ort into hours worked. The implied expression for the Solow residual is:
Z^t = Y^
va
t  

K^t + u^t + (1  ) L^t

:
By log-di¤erentiating the aggregate production function in mymodel on the non-stochastic
balanced growth path, I obtain:
A^t = Y^t   (1  )

K^t + u^t + (1  ) L^t

  X^t:
Then, considering the fact that gross output growth, Y^t; can be partitioned in intermediate
inputs growth, X^t; and value added output growth, Y^ vat :
Y^t = X^t + (1  ) Y^ vat ;
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I obtain the nal expression for the Solow residual implied by my model:
A^t
(1  ) = Y^
va
t  

K^t + u^t + (1  ) L^t

:
Therefore Z^t = A^t(1 ) ; which implies a = (1  )z:
Tables 
 
Table 1- Forecast error decomposition –VAR, U.S., 1959-2:2007:2 
Horizons 1 5 10 20 
Technology Shock 0.68 
(0.20) 
0.52 
(0.14) 
0.45 
(0.12) 
0.33 
(0.11) 
Monetary policy shock 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.14 
(0.07) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Taylor rule estimation, U.S., 1959:2-2007:2 
c ρr φπ φy 
-0.2 
(0.07) 
0.96 
(0.03) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.2 
(0.04) 
ttyttrt uyrcr ++++= − φπφρ π1  
The constant c is scaled on the basis of annualized nominal interest rates, expressed in percent. SSR is 0.64. 
The R2 is 0.94. 
 
 
Table 2 - Parameters Calibration 
β 1.03-0.25 
δ 0.025 
ϕl 1 
α 0.36 
b 0.7 
S’’(1) 5 
ψσ  0.5 
θ 4 
μ 0.75 
γa 0.001 
ρa 0 
r
a
σ
σ  1 
κ 4 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: IRF to 1 b.p. TFP and FFR shock, Benchmark VAR, U.S. 1959:2-2007:2 
 
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Output
0 5 10 15 20
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Inflation
Technology Shock
0 5 10 15 20
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Output
0 5 10 15 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Inflation
Fed Funds Shock
 
 
 
Figure 2: Price responses relative to complete information, Static Model 
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Figure 3: Attention Multiplier as a function of κ, Static Model 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Information Flow, k
A
tte
nt
io
n 
m
ul
til
pi
er
, x
Attention Multiplier
 
Figure 4: Attention Multiplier as a function of ξ, Static Model 
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Figure 5: Price responses to εr relative to complete information as a function of  
               ξ and κ, Static Model 
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Figure 6: Price responses to εa relative to complete information as a function of   
               ξ and κ, Static Model 
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Figure 7: IRF to 1 basis point shock to εa and εr, Complete information∗ 
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Figure 8: IRF to 1 basis point shock to εa and εr, Rational Inattention 
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∗ Notice that a 1 basis point shock to εa corresponds to a 1/(1-μ) basis point shock to TFP in the VAR. For 
more details see Appendix D. All responses are expressed in percent values. 
Figure 9: IRF to 1 basis point shock to εa and εr, Rational Inattention and 
Complete Info, low strategic complementarities in prices, μ=0.5 
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Figure 10: IRF to 1 basis point shock to εa and εr, Rational Inattention and 
Complete Info, monetary policy less aggressive on output growth, φy= 0.1 
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Figure 11: IRF to 1 basis point shock to εa and εr,  Rational Inattention and 
Complete Info, monetary policy more aggressive on inflation, φπ= 0.3 
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Figure 12: Price responses relative to complete information as a function of κ, 
Static Model with signals on endogenous variables 
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